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Abstract 
Employment discrimination has been existed through the history and gender 
discrimination is one of the most common one. The discrimination against women is the 
most discussed one but the discrimination against unmarried women is easily ignored. 
While comparing women and men, marital status is considered as one of the factors that 
decreases women’s competitiveness. However, the marital status, as some people complain, 
turns into a potential advantage while comparing two equally qualified women. This study 
focuses on main questions: 1) Does the discrimination against unmarried women while 
comparing with married women really exist, or is it just reasonable selection? 2) If the 
discrimination exists, how much do unmarried women suffer in both employment rate and 
income aspects? 3) Does the education level play an important role in the discrimination? 
China is facing fifteen million people in employment pressure annually. No matter how 
small the discriminatory proportion is, it becomes a huge social problem due to the huge 
base number. The econometrics part shows the existence of discrimination in both 
employment rate and income. Unmarried women are facing a lower employment rate at 
certain ages and the unmarried women with primary education or secondary education are 
facing a lower income.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
China is facing annual employment pressure of fifteen million occupations demand 
and most of them are urban employment pressure.1 High unemployment rate is always 
considered as one of the most important factors leading to social instability. Since China 
occupies almost one fifths global population, every small social problem is able to cause 
huge problem and every hidden danger that might cause social problem has to be dealt with 
seriously. The discrimination against unmarried women is likely to become one of the 
hidden threats. 
Some have argued that the so called discrimination is only reasonable selection. 
Comparing with male, female has physiological disadvantage and disadvantage in family 
division. The physiological disadvantage is obvious that female women’s strength is 
weaker. In 2014, 10% of the whole urban employed male population is engaged in the 
construction industry and 8.2% of the whole urban employed male population is engaged 
in the transport, storage and post industry. During the same period, only 2.3% of the whole 
urban employed female population is engaged in the construction industry and 2.4% of the 
whole urban employed female population is engaged in the transport, storage and post 
                                                             
1 According to the speech of director of Institute of International Labor and Social Security, Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security in 2016.  
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2016-07-14/doc-ifxuapvs8416880.shtml 
2 
industry.2 Considering the female proportion of the whole employed population is 44.8%,3 
it turns out 84.3% of the construction industry is occupied by male workers and 80.8% of 
the transport, storage and post industry is occupied by male workers. This shows the 
dominance of male in such categories that is highly physical power required. Another 
disadvantage that has been frequently discussed is the role of female in family division. 
Women have usually been considered as the role that should take more responsibility in 
housework and raising children in both USA4 and China5. Therefore, women have to spend 
more time and energy on family issues and this situation makes them less competitive. 
Even it is true, they are not the only factors that influence women’s employment rate and 
income, especially for the unmarried women who do not have the responsibility of family 
issues at all.  
According to a survey held in several universities in Shanghai, 63.7% of female 
graduates and 47.6% male graduates believe there is employment discrimination against 
female graduates.6 Furthermore, according to a survey held by Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security in sixty-two cities, 67% of the employers asked for marital status and 
among the more detailed questions, relationship status (58.9%), plan of marriage (42.9%), 
                                                             
2 China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2015, 3-17: Urban Employed Persons by Age, Sex and Sector 
 
3 2014 China Women’s Development Program(2011--2020) Implementation Statistics Report 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201511/t20151127_1282257.html 
 
4 Condran J G, Bode J G. Rashomon, working wives, and family division of labor: Middletown, 1980[J]. Journal of 
Marriage and the Family, 1982: 421-426. 
 
5 Anqi Xu, couple’s power and women's family status evaluation index: refection and review [J]. Sociological 
Research, 2005, 4(1) 
 
6 Implementation Report on the Program for the Development of Chinese Women and Children in Shanghai 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw9819/nw9822/u21aw179147.html 
3 
plan of child birth (49.1%) and work intent after child birth (40.9%) are the most frequently 
asked questions.7 
Any question that asks a candidate to reveal information about marital status topic 
without the question having a job related basis will violate the various state and federal 
discrimination laws in United States of America.8 However, there is no law against such 
questions during job interview or resume for record in China so the employers can ask for 
marital status freely. It is true that the employees can fake the marital status during 
interview and this action will not considered as fraud because the marital status is not 
necessary for employers to evaluate the capability and workers do not owe the duty of 
truthfully informing.9 But the employees are usually on the weaker side in the employment 
because the promotion and dismissing are controlled by the employer to a great extent. As 
a risk-taking side, the employee usually do not cheat on this question and this provides the 
conditions for employers to make discrimination.  
The reason that marital status is the most frequently asked is the effect of Chinese 
fertility situation, government policy and statistics discrimination. In Europe, most 
countries are classified into very low fertility and some of those countries are facing lowest-
low fertility situations which means the fertility rate is smaller than 1.3.10 Japan, a country 
that shares similar Asian culture, is also experiencing a lowest-low fertility. In China, even 
                                                             
7 The Second Sample Survey of Social Status of Chinese Women 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/200203/t20020331_30606.html 
 
8 Said by Lori Adelson, a labor and employment attorney.  
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/11-illegal-interview-questions-2013-7#have-you-ever-been-arrested-1 
 
9 Said by Mingqing Yu, deputy director of Regulations Department, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
http://china.findlaw.cn/laodongfa/laodongdongtai/1114452.html 
 
10 Billari F, Kohler H P. Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe [J]. Population studies, 2004, 58(2): 161-
176. 
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under the influence of one-child policy for almost 25 years, the fertility rate is 1.611 which 
means every woman is raising 1.6 child on average. Also, China is a relatively traditional 
country in general, unmarried pregnancy is not encouraged or perhaps regarded as taboo12 
in some areas and procreation is considered as a very important part of marriage. The 
following figure shows the proportion of unmarried women (from 20-year old to 35-year 
old) who have at least one child and the proportion of married women (from 20-year old 
to 35-year old) who have at least one child.13 
Figure 1 
 
Among unmarried women, there are only 0.53% population are raising child. Among 
married women, there are 83.74% population are raising child. Besides this statistical 
results, several regulations can explain the phenomenon more. If the woman is having a 
child before getting married, she will face a penalty called social upbringing charges.14 In 
                                                             
11 The data is claimed by The World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN? 
 
12 In some areas, if the bride is pregnant before marriage, the people who know about this should avoid attending the 
wedding.  
http://mt.sohu.com/20151018/n423521139.shtml 
 
13 Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (2008), Urban Household Survey 
 
14 Law of the People's Republic of China on Population and Family Planning, Art.41 
0.53%
99.47%
Unmarried Women
Have at least one child Have no child
83.74%
16.26%
Married Women
Have at least one child Have no child
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order to cooperate with one-child policy, abortion is legal in the whole country. For the 
unmarried women who get pregnant, they do not have to give birth. Therefore, the marital 
status is highly correlated with fertility status.  
The one-child policy had gone into effect from 1980 to 2015 and it has been replaced 
by two-child policy since 2016 to response the coming aging society in few decades.15 If 
the married women is already having a child, she is not legitimately eligible to raise the 
second child before 2016.  
The statistical discrimination pioneered by Kenneth Arrow (1973) and Edmund 
Phelps (1972) claimed that due to the absence of direct information about a certain fact of 
ability, a decision maker would substitute group averages.16 Under incomplete information 
conditions, the employers can save time and money by doing this to achieve higher benefit. 
On one hand, investigating fertility status costs more and it will increase the risk of getting 
sued for discrimination17 because the question of fertility status is more obvious to be 
considered as a discrimination. On the other hand, Chinses tradition and one-child policy 
make employers treat all married women as the women who already have a child and no 
plan for another child.  
It is not possible to prove that marital status is always used as a proxy for fertility 
status for discriminatory purposes, but it is our speculation that this is commonly the case. 
                                                             
15 Since 2016, a family is allowed to have two children in total according to the new change of Law of Population and 
Family Planning. Before 2016, each family can only have one child, more children will be considered as breaking the 
law.  
 
16 Fang H, Moro A. Theories of statistical discrimination and affirmative action: A survey[R]. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2010. 
 
17 We certainly have the law protection against employment discrimination (Labor Law of the People's Republic of China 
Act 12), but we do not have the law against questions about private information. It is less risky by just asking marital 
status rather than asking fertility status for the latter question is easier to be identified as evidence against employers.  
6 
Furthermore, some statistical results support the plausibility of this assumption. First, the 
statistics results provide the foundation. Almost none of single woman is raising a child 
and most of married women are having at least one child. It means the employers are able 
to use marital status as a proxy of fertility status. Second, the discrimination against 
unmarried women has officially been confirmed by the supreme power in China. During 
the press conference of 5th Session of 12th National People’s Congress held on March 4th 
2017, the deputy Secretary-General Ying Fu claimed, employment discrimination has 
existed for a long time and there are indeed some young unmarried women facing unfair 
treatment during employment. She also presented an example on the press conference, once 
a man told her that he just finished a recruitment work and he rejected a young woman with 
very good qualifications. He said there are few people in his department, if there comes a 
childbearing age female employee and have two children after, his department’s working 
efficiency will be influenced.18 The National People’s Congress is the organization of 
supreme authority in China19 and the content delivered to media at the press conference 
has to be very important. We cannot make sure that marital status is always used as a proxy 
of fertility status. But it can be used as a proxy, and it has been abused so seriously that a 
national leader pointed it out on the press conference.  
Based on Becker’s taste-based model (1957), Youbao Zhao (2005) claimed the 
solutions of decreasing discrimination against unmarried women is cutting off the 
                                                             
18 Ying Fu, the chairperson of National People's Congress Foreign Affairs Committee 
Ying Fu: After two-child policy, female employment discrimination is more prominent  
http://yanglao.china.com.cn/roll/2017/0305/1345.html 
 
19 Constitution of People’s Republic of China, Art 2.2 
7 
naturally-attached costs that employers are facing as much as possible but no actual feasible 
policy is assumed under Chinese conditions.20  
Overall speaking, the difference between an unmarried woman and a married woman 
becomes the core part of this research. Specifically, we investigate whether there are 
measurable negative effects in terms of employment and income for being single that can 
be attributed to discrimination against unmarried women. 
                                                             
20 Youbao Zhao. Anti-sexism in Job-Hunting: An Economics Analysis[J] Journal of Shandong University of Science 
and Technology: Social Science, 2005, 7(1):70-74 
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Chapter Two: Chinese Social Structure and Labor Market 
This chapter is providing the basic related background of Chinese labor market, social 
structure in order to help understand the Chinese special conditions so that I can further 
explain the employment discrimination of unmarried women.  
Main Indicators of Chinese Social Structure 
China is a country that population of male is significant more than that of female. But 
the proportion of male is decreasing through 2000 to 2015 as shown in the following 
figure:21 
Figure 2 
                                                             
21 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, from year 2001 to year 2016 
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The population in urban and rural areas have changed a lot through years. In 1952, the 
proportion of rural residents is 87.5%, but it reached to 43.9% at the end of 2015.22 That 
is, the proportion of urban residents increased from 12.5% to 56.1% from 1952 to 2015. 
This urbanization is considered as one of the important index that marks China’s transition 
from agricultural country to industrial country.23The following figure is the compensation 
of population by residence from 2000 to 2015.24 
Figure 3: 
 
Another important index that reveals the social structure is dependency ratio of 
population. The dependency ratio consists of children dependency ratio and old 
dependency ratio. The gross dependency ratio refers to the ratio of non-working-age 
population to the working-age population. The old dependency ratio refers to the ratio of 
                                                             
22 China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2015 
 
23 Houkai Wei, Yeqiang Wang, Hongjian Su. Comprehensive Evaluation Report on Urbanization Quality in China [J]. 
Economic Research Reference, 2013, 31(2) 
 
24 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, from year 2001 to year 2016 
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elderly population to the working-age population. The children dependency ratio refers to 
the ratio of children population to the working-age population. The gross dependency ratio 
is regarded as labor supply level. Smaller dependency ratio means less social burden.25 
Higher dependency ratio means more social urban because each labor is responsible for 
raising responsibility. The following figure shows the gross dependency ratio, children 
dependency ratio and old dependency through years.26 
Figure 4 
     
The gross dependency ratio has significantly decreased since 1999 and it has been less 
than 40% since 2005. There is an increasing trend of gross dependency ratio since 2010 
but it is still less than 40% level. As a comparison, the gross dependency ratio in Japan is 
64% and the ratio in USA is 51% at the end of 2015.27 
                                                             
25 Grasp the Opportunity of Demographic Window to Promote Social Harmony. Dec 26th, 2008 
http://epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/html/2008-12/26/content_6712557.htm 
 
26 China Statistical Yearbook 2016. 
 
27 Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND 
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Since this thesis focuses on the employment discrimination of unmarried women on 
the basis of future child-bearing, the composition of population by marital status is 
necessary to present. The data of both male and female is shown in the following figure.28 
Figure 5: 
 
From the figure we can see that the proportion of unmarried men and women are both 
decreasing as age grows. Also, the proportion of unmarried men is higher than that of 
unmarried women at all ages.  
When we focus on the change of proportion, we can estimate the rate of single people 
getting married. The following figure shows the proportion change of both men and women. 
                                                             
28 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 2016 
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Figure 6: 
 
Each data here represents the difference between proportion of single people at current 
age and previous age. For example, the data of female at age 21 is -4.4% which means the 
proportion of single women at age 21 is 4.4% smaller than the proportion of single women 
at age 20. Therefore, this figure can be considered as a proximate derivative of the function 
in figure 4. It shows that the proximate derivative function of male is decreasing from age 
21 to 27 and it is increasing from 28. The proximate derivative function of female is 
decreasing from age 21 to 24, it remains still from 25 to 27 and it is increasing from 28. 
Therefore, the function of male in figure 4 is concave from age 20 to 27 and it is convex 
from age 28. The function of female in figure 4 is concave from age 20 to 23 and it is 
convex from age 28. The feature of a decreasing convex function is that the rate of change 
is decreasing, in other words, the rate of single men and women getting married is 
decreasing from age 28. 
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In Chinese families, the proportion of female homemakers is much larger than the 
proportion of male homemakers. The following figure shows the data.29 
Figure 7 
 
From the figure7, we can see that in both rural and urban districts, female homemakers 
are much more than male homemakers. Also, both male and female homemaker 
proportions in rural districts are larger than that in urban districts. This implies there are 
more two-earner households in urban areas. 
Main Indicators of Chinese Labor Market 
The following sketch shows the total population, population aged 16 and over and 
employment from year 2000 to 2015.30 
                                                             
29 China Households Income Project 2014 
 
30 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, from year 2001 to year 2016 
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Figure 8 
 
This sketch shows that whole population, population aged 16 and over and 
employment have all increased steadily since 2000. It is noticed that the change of 
population aged 16 and over between 2009 and 2010 is 30 million which is much larger 
than usual level. Before 2009, the annual change is basically between 9 to 15 million. After 
2010, the annual change is basically between 6 to 9 million. Also, the annual increase in 
whole population is 5 to 8 million. Therefore, the increase of population aged 16 and over 
is abnormally huge. Since the legal age of employment is 16, we can conclude the 
employment pressure is larger in 2009.  
The following figure shows the composition of employment by industry from year 
2000 to 2015.31 
                                                             
31 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, from year 2001 to year 2016 
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Figure 9 
 
At the beginning of this century, the employment of primary industry occupies half of 
total employment and this situation remains for the next three years until 2003. From 2004, 
the proportion of employment in primary industry has decreased continuously and it only 
occupies 28.3% of whole employment at the end of 2015. The proportion of employment 
in secondary industry did not change much from 2000 to 2004, but it has begun to increase 
since 2005. At the end of 2015, the proportion of employment in secondary industry is 
29.3%. The proportion of employment in tertiary industry has increased continuously since 
the beginning of this century from 27.5% to 42.2%. According to this sketch, the 
composition of employment by industry changed a lot from 2000 to 2015. The employment 
is dominated by primary industry in 2000, but it is dominated by tertiary industry in 2015. 
Also, both secondary industry and tertiary industry employment have increased 
significantly, primary industry employment is the only one that decreases.  
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As shown in figure 3, urban population is increasing continuously which necessary 
contributes to increasing urban employments. The following figure shows the composition 
of employment by district.32  
Figure 10 
 
As shown in the figure, the urban employment is keeping increasing and rural 
employment is keeping decreasing. Due to the difference between rural and urban districts, 
the proportions of employers, employees and the self-employed are different in urban and 
rural employment. 
                                                             
32 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, from year 2001 to year 2016 
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Figure 11 
 
As it shown in figure 11, the proportion of employee in urban employment is 86.3% 
and the proportion of employee in rural employment occupies only 26.3%.33 This is not 
strange because most of people in rural districts engage in agricultural activities and they 
are self-sufficient. But in urban districts, most of people have to find an occupation to feed 
themselves. Comparing with rural districts, labor market plays a much more important role 
in urban districts. This is the reason that I choose urban households data to study the 
employment discrimination of unmarried women.  
There are several kinds of enterprises according to ownership. The units that more 
than half of property controlled by the government are named state-owned units. The units 
that more than half of property controlled by urban collective are named urban collective-
owned units. The units that controlled by individuals and self-employed people are named 
private enterprises and individuals. All other types are classified as other ownership which 
                                                             
33 Chinese Households Income Project 2014. 
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includes joint-stock units, joint venture unit, limited-liability companies and foreign 
companies. 34 The following figure shows the composition of urban employment by 
ownership by the end of 2015.35 
Figure 12 
 
As shown in figure 11, over half of urban employments are employed by private 
enterprises or self-employed. The public ownership units, state-owned units and urban 
collective-owned units, occupies only 18.1% of urban employment. But at the end of 1995, 
the public ownership units occupies 94.2% of urban employment.36  
Since this study is concentrating on female, especially the unmarried female, the 
proportion of female employment is also another important indicator to understand female 
                                                             
34 Explanation of Main Statistical Indicators 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/html/5i.htm 
 
35 China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2016 
 
36 China Labor Statistical Yearbook 1996 
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employment conditions. The following figure is the proportion of female employment in 
urban units by sector.37 
Figure 13 
 
This figure shows there are five categories where female employment proportion is 
higher than 50% and fourteen categories where female employment proportion is less than 
50%. This data shows that female employment is less than male employment on average 
but we cannot conclude anything about employment discrimination without further 
discussion.  
The Difference between Married and Unmarried Women 
As I discussed in the introduction part, the unmarried and married women are treated 
differently not just because of the marital status, it is the fertility status that actually makes 
difference. The most important difference between a woman without child and a woman 
                                                             
37 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, from year 2001 to year 2016 
36.1%
18.4%
39.9%
27.7%
11.1%
50.6%
26.1%
55.2%
39.2%
51.7%
37.2%
32.8%
30.5%
40.6%
41.6%
53.7%
63.1%
44.6%
31.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Proportion of Female Employment in Urban Units
20 
with a child is the pregnancy period. In the view of employers, the woman without child is 
almost certainly going to raise a child in the future sooner or later. However, before 2016, 
the woman who has already have a child is probably not going to raise another child at all. 
After hiring an unmarried woman, the employers must get prepared for the costs during 
women’s coming pregnancy period. There are several reasons that employers are going to 
take the risk of both financial costs and potential costs. 
Working Efficiency Decrease 
First of all, women’s pregnancy affects working efficiency significantly. It has been 
researched that 25.54% of pregnant women have anxiety problem and 19.84% of pregnant 
women have depression problem and it is unavoidable due to hormone.38 Besides the 
mental issues, the pregnant employees are having three kinds of compulsory leave and 
three extra kinds of optional leave. Every pregnant employee has an extra hour per day if 
the pregnancy period lasts longer than seven months. That is, the pregnant employees are 
having an hour break every day during the last two months of her pregnancy period which 
is called pre-maternity leave and the night work is strictly prohibited.39 Also, every 
woman who returned work after child birth are having an hour break for breastfeeding 
every day until the baby reaches his one-year-old birthday.40 This kind of leave is called 
breastfeeding time. The last and the most important compulsory leave is maternity leave. 
According to Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, pregnant women 
have the right to apply for maternity leave for ninety-eight days. Among the ninety-eight 
                                                             
38 Yanqiong Zhao, Mujun Li, Yue Chen, Pregnancy Anxiety, Depression and Its Influencing Factors in Pregnant 
Women [J]. Journal of Practical Obstetrics and Gynecology, 2006, 22(10): 608-610. 
 
39 Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, Art. 6.2. 
 
40 Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, Art. 9.2.  
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days, fifteen days are prior to child birth and eighty-three days are after child birth.41 The 
other three optional leave has to be approved by employers before taking effect. The first 
optional leave is optional pre-maternity leave. Only the women who is at least seven 
month pregnant is qualified to apply for optional pre-maternity leave which lasts two and 
half months. The employer has full authority to determine whether approve or not so it 
depends on each firm’s own regulations. The second optional leave is breastfeeding 
leave42 which lasts for six and half months. Only the woman after child birth who has 
trouble breastfeeding her child is qualified to apply for this kind of leave. This application 
will be evaluated by employers and they have the right to reject it. The last optional leave 
is protection leave and the duration depends. The protection leave is a little bit special 
because not every pregnant woman is qualified to apply for. Only the pregnant woman who 
has the proof issued by at least a rank two hospital of the sickness that might influence 
normal fertility is eligible. The approval is depending on every firm’s own regulations of 
sick leave. Even it is optional and the employer has the right to reject the application, it is 
very rare that rejection happens in real life. Since the proof issued by the hospital is 
revealing the seriousness of the pregnant condition and pregnancy is pretty important to a 
family, employers usually approve that kind of leave. To avoid confusion, the following 
table is the summary. 
 
 
                                                             
41 Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, Art. 7.1. 
 
42 This breastfeeding leave is totally different from the breastfeeding time. Breastfeeding leave is optional and it can 
be rejected by employers, but breastfeeding time is compulsory and insured by law. Also, the duration is different. 
Breastfeeding leave can last for at most six and half months, but the breastfeeding time only provide one hour per day 
until baby is one-year-old. 
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Table 1 
Compulsory Duration Optional Duration 
Pre-maternity leave 1 hour per day for 
2 months 
Optional pre-maternity leave 2 and half 
months 
Breastfeeding time 1 hour per day 
until baby one-
year-old 
Breastfeeding leave 6 and half 
months 
Maternity leave 98 days Protection leave Depends 
 
Instability Increase 
The on-going program or training has to suspend and some of them have to be 
abandoned due to the timeliness.43 If someone is in charge of a program with a time limit 
of six months, the pregnancy will disorganize the program plan and even contributes to 
program cancellation. Changing the principal of the program temporarily will lead to extra 
cost and it is definitely not welcome by managers. If someone is in the middle of a pre-
work training program and applying for the maternity leave, that will become a huge 
problem. Since the training program is occupying long period and is not held at any 
moment, it is held with a certain cycle annually. If the woman is applying for maternity 
leave, the employer has no choice but to approve according to the law. Therefore, this 
woman has to skip this cycle of pre-work training program and wait for the next. If one 
cycle takes one year, that means she has to attend work without basic training for 9 months 
which is one year minus three month maternity leave. Her competitiveness will be lower 
comparing with other colleges and she will face the potential risk of getting fired right after 
child birth. 
                                                             
43 Kangsi Z. On the Interaction of Gender Discrimination in Employment and Human Capital Investment Bias [J]. 
Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences), 2009, 5: 013. 
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If the protection leave is approved, situations will become more complicated because 
it cut the employee’s working period into more pieces and it makes her less able to take 
charge of any program.  
Financial Loss 
Thirdly and more importantly, the employer has to pay for women’s pre-maternity 
leave, breastfeeding time and maternity leave. During this period, employers has to pay 
full amount salary while they benefit nothing from these women. However, the financial 
loss is much more in real life. According to the law, women have the right to ask for a 
fifteen-day leave before child birth. But it does not necessarily mean the pregnant women 
can keep the working efficiency as much as it required during the rest of pregnancy period. 
In some employment categories, especially those with high physical labor requirements, 
pregnant women have to decrease their labor intensity in order to have sufficient rest. Also, 
employers usually give the pregnant women privilege in consideration of being polite and 
kind. Therefore, the financial loss is potentially increased as the shown in the following 
sketch.  
Figure 14 
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Let the vertical axis be the productivity, let the horizontal axis be the pregnancy period. 
During normal period, the work-wage index should approximately be a constant number 
because it is determined by the employee’s own ability of working efficiency. Fifteen days 
before child birth, the work-wage index should become zero because she delivers non work 
but still receive normal wage. This period ends at three months after child birth. When the 
employee come back to work after using up, she still receives wage for an hour 
breastfeeding time every day, so the work-wage index should be lower than it should be.  
Due to physical inconvenience and pre-maternity leave, the employee’s working 
efficiency is not possible to hold still during the pregnancy period. The work-wage index 
should, in fact, decrease along the time as the wage does not change. This period loss, 
which is area A, consists of the payment for pre-maternity leave. Therefore, the employers 
are facing more financial loss than it revealed by law. The second period loss is area B 
caused by the maternity leave. The third period loss is area C caused by breastfeed time.  
Implicit Work Increase 
The absence of pregnant women will increase the colleagues’ work and it will make 
both employer and her colleagues bear more pressure. Let’s assume everyone is dealing 
with the same amount of work y during a certain period, n workers in total and x workers 
that are taking the maternity leave. Therefore, the average work for every worker before 
someone is taking the maternity leave is: 
𝑦1 = 𝑦 
The average work for every worker who is still on duty after someone is taking the 
maternity leave is: 
𝑦2 =
𝑦𝑛
𝑛 − 𝑥
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One way to verify the influence of worker amount on average work or the influence 
of absent pregnant worker amount on average work is taking partial derivative: 
∂y2
∂n
= −
𝑦𝑥
(𝑛 − 𝑥)2
 
∂𝑦2
∂x
=
𝑦𝑛
(𝑛 − 𝑥)2
 
In the first equation, the numerator and denominator are positive, therefore, the partial 
derivative of average work with respect to worker amount is negative. It means more 
workers will reduce the new average work and dilute the side-effect of the pregnant absence. 
If the total worker number is relatively much larger than absent pregnant worker. The new 
average work is almost the same as before which means the absent pregnant worker barely 
make a difference. But if the total worker number is not significantly huge, they will face 
a significant increase of average work. In the second equation, the numerator and 
denominator are positive, therefore, the partial derivative of average work with respect to 
pregnant worker amount is positive. It means the average work strictly increase as long as 
pregnant worker amount increases. It makes perfect sense because more pregnant workers 
will leave more unfinished work for their colleagues. Once there exist pregnant worker, the 
whole working group or department members are facing higher pressure and it is definitely 
not welcome by the employ.  
The extra work for every rest worker should be: 
Δ𝑦 =
𝑦𝑛
𝑛 − 𝑥
− 𝑦 =
𝑦𝑥
𝑛 − 𝑥
 
The coefficient of extra work should be: 
Δ𝑦
𝑦
=
𝑥
𝑛 − 𝑥
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This function can be sketched as: 
Figure 15 
 
As it shown in the graph, more pregnant workers lead to higher extra-work coefficient 
when worker amount holds still in every case. Furthermore, lower worker amount lead to 
higher extra-work coefficient in every case which means the scale of company matters. If 
the scale of company is relatively small, the scale of departments is expected to be small 
and the workers in the same department have to take relatively more work. In other words, 
the smaller companies suffer more from maternity leave. Let me take the Bank of 
Communication Jiangsu Province Branch as an example. The department of investment 
bank has only sixteen employees and seven of them are responsible for the bond business 
around the whole province. If one female employee is pregnant, the other six employees 
have to take 17% extra work on average. Otherwise, the department is facing 14% profit 
loss in bond business which is too huge to give up.  
At the end of 2013, small and micro enterprises occupies 76.57% of the total amount 
of enterprises in China. Over 70% of new employment and reemployment are concentrated 
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in small and micro enterprises.44 Since lots of provincial governments have issued new 
policies of tax concession and relief for small and micro enterprises45, the proportion of 
small and micro enterprises is expected to increase continuously. 46 
Unmarried Women’s Advantages 
The previous three disadvantages, instability increase, financial loss and implicit work 
increase are all coming from pregnancy. Except for the disadvantages, the unmarried 
women still have their own advantages comparing with married women. Childrearing may 
reduce the amount of effort available for married women to devote to work,47 in other 
words, unmarried women have more available effort do devote to work.  
Employer’s Preference 
According to the previous discussion, what employers worry about the unmarried 
women is not them being single. On the contrary, an unmarried woman has more advantage 
than a married woman. To the employers, the truth is they worry about those single women 
getting married and getting pregnant. Due to the one-child policy, the employers do not 
worry about a married woman having a second child.48 To them, hiring an unmarried 
female might increase their cost.  
The probability of an unmarried woman getting married becomes a risk of loss to the 
employers. Once an unmarried employee is hired, on one hand, the employer is benefitting 
                                                             
44 Report on the development of small micro - enterprises in China, 2013 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-03/31/content_2650031.htm 
 
45 Notice on Further Strengthening the Implementation of Tax Preferential Policies for Small and Micro Enterprises, 
2014, issued by State Administration of Taxation 
 
46 Junfeng Wang, Yan Wang. Research on the Development of Small and Micro Enterprises in China [J]. Business 
Research, 2012 (9):86-93 
 
47 Becker G S, Becker G S. A Treatise on the Family [M]. Harvard university press, 2009. 
 
48 When the employer hires a married woman, she probably already has a child according to the previous data.  
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from her more available effort, on the other hand, the employer is facing a risk of her being 
married and pregnant. It is easy to imagine that the employers are taking higher risk if the 
unmarried employees are very young and they are taking less risk if the unmarried 
employees are not young. If the risk of getting married is considered as a negative effect, 
the more available effort is considered as a positive effect, then the employer should weigh 
the positive effect and negative effect. If the negative effect is weighed more than positive 
effect, the employer is less likely to hire the unmarried woman. If the negative effect is 
weighed less than positive effect, the employer is more likely to hire the unmarried woman. 
Since the probability of getting married is not constant through aging, the risk that 
employers take should not be constant. If the unmarried women’s advantage against 
married women is assumed as constant. The employers’ preference should vary through 
different age. The detailed discussion is presented in the discussion chapter.  
Maternity Insurance  
Apparently, the cost of child birth is undertaken by both employee and employer. The 
part of cost that employers undertake is the main cause of the discrimination against 
unmarried women. If the fertility cost can be reduced, the discrimination phenomenon will 
be less serious. The fertility cost cannot disappear by itself, it can only be spread. Current 
maternity insurance is one example of spreading fertility cost but not an efficient way.   
The current maternity insurance is one of the five basic employment insurances. The 
insurance premium is paid by employer and the monthly insurance premium rate has been 
limited to 0.5% of total salary in current month since October, 2015.49 The main outcomes 
                                                             
49 The former insurance premium was 0.6% to 0.8% of total salary. It was estimated this insurance premium rate 
decrease can help employers save 12 billion yuan per year.  
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of paying maternity insurance are medical service and childbirth allowance. The medical 
service covers the payment of necessary antenatal examination and medical care of 
childbirth. The childbirth allowance is paid to employers to make up for the cost of 
maternity leave.  
There are few problems with current insurances. First, the medical service cannot be 
used in private hospitals, it can only be used in public hospitals. Second, the medical service 
covers only part of the total cost. For example, the medical service covers only 1400 yuan 
of antenatal examination at most and the exceeding part is taken care by pregnant women 
herself. Second, the amount of insured people with maternity insurance is much lesser than 
it should be. By the end of 2015, there are only 184 million people are insured by maternity 
insurance while there are 748 million people are insured by medical insurance at the same 
time.50Since the employers should pay the insurance premium for both male and female 
employers, most of the employers are not insured properly. Third, deduction of childbirth 
allowance happens sometimes. If the income of the pregnant woman is less than 60% of 
the average local income, the childbirth allowance is determined by 60% of the average 
income. Since the childbirth allowance is transferred to the company’s account first and 
delivered to employees after, it is possible that the exceeding part of the childbirth 
allowance is hidden by employers on purpose. If the income of the pregnant women is 
more than 300% of the average local income, the childbirth allowance is determined by 
300% of the average local income, the shortage should be complemented by employers. It 
is also possible that the shortage part is rejected by the employers. The fourth and the most 
                                                             
50 2016 Human Resources and Social Security Statistics Express issued by Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security on Feb 15th, 2017. 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/dtyjsu/201702/t20170215_266193.html 
30 
important reason is that legal supervision of maternity insurance is absolutely not enough51 
and the result is that most of employees are not properly insured, as the data shown 
previously. In contrast, the legal supervision of maternity pay is very strict.52 Because the 
amount of pregnant employees are much lesser than the whole population of employees, it 
is easier for Human Resources and Social Security Bureau to provide help and obtain 
evidence. This leads to the situation that employers sometimes refuse to pay the maternity 
insurance premium without bearing legal liability but they do not take the risk of refusing 
to pay the maternity pay. For those employers, they tend to decrease the proportion of 
unmarried women to avoid the cost.  
The current method of socializing maternity cost is not efficient, the cost needs to be 
further spread. A revision of this maternity insurance is going to be tested in 12 districts for 
one year from June, 2017.53 The major change of current maternity insurance is combining 
medical insurance and maternity insurance and maternity insurance will no longer be paid 
separately. There are two results of this revision. The first impact is the amount of maternity 
insured employees will increase significantly. According to the previous data, 184 million 
people are insured by maternity insurance and 748 million people are insured by medical 
insurance. The amount of insured employee will increase by three times. The second 
impact is reduction of employers’ cost. The current maternity leave is fully paid by 
employers, which is the main reason of unwilling to hire unmarried women. But the 
                                                             
51 Yongping Jiang. Reform and Perfection of Maternity Insurance System from the Perspective of Gender[J] Women's 
Studies, 2013(1): 47-53 
 
52 Zijun Yu. A Study on the Legal Problems of Maternity Insurance for Female Workers in China[D] University of 
Anhui, 2015 
 
53 Maternity insurance and the basic medical insurance merger and implementation of the pilot program, issued by 
Office of State Council on Feb 4th, 2017 
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medical insurance premium is not fully paid by employers, employees also have to pay 
partially. According to the law, the employers need to pay 6% of the salary as the medical 
insurance premium and the employees need to pay 2% of the salary as the premium. 
Therefore, the employers are only required to pay 75% of total premium and the employees 
are responsible for the rest 25%. If the maternity insurance is included in the medical 
insurance, the employers will reduce 20% of the cost on maternity insurance premium. The 
first impact can enlarge the population to split the cost, so the premium rate is expected to 
decrease. The second impact allows employers’ cost further decrease. 
The Influence of Education Level 
There are eight education levels and three ranks in total, the level beneath elementary 
school, elementary school, junior high school, senior high school, specialized secondary 
and technical school, polytechnic college, undergraduate degree and graduate degree. 
Elementary school degree is ranked as primary education. Junior high school, senior high 
school, specialized secondary and technical school are ranked as secondary education. 
Polytechnic college, undergraduate degree and graduate degree are ranked as higher 
education. 
Note that the compulsory education level in China is junior high school. Usually 
people have the duty to spend six years in elementary school and three years in junior high 
school, but higher level is not compulsory. Therefore, there are two branches after finishing 
junior high school, senior high school or specialized secondary school. Both of them costs 
three years. This is different from the schools in USA because the junior high school in 
USA takes two years and senior high school takes four years. Since the specialized 
32 
secondary and technical schools are teaching professional working skills in many areas, 
students from there are more prepared to work in factory than those with only senior high 
school degree.  
There are also two branches after finishing senior high school while those who finish 
specialized secondary school have no choice but to go to find a job. These two branches 
are polytechnic college and university. Polytechnic colleges are teaching higher rank skills 
than specialized secondary school, therefore, the students with this degree are expected to 
have higher salary than those with specialized secondary school degree. However, what 
people learned from polytechnic college are restricted within factory works and other areas 
alike. They are not as competitive as those knowledge in university. That is why people 
who graduated with undergraduate degree or graduate degree are rarer and get more paid. 
Here is the figure that shows the progressive relationship among these seven education 
levels.  
Figure 16 
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It has been discovered that education level and certain industries are highly correlated 
in China.54 Also, employees that belong to different kind of industry should share the 
similar characteristics. The following table will present this idea. 
  
                                                             
54 Xuebing Qiao, Wenfan Yao, Dinghai Zhao. Research on the Relationship between Higher Education Structure, 
Graduates' Employment Structure and Industrial Structure [J]. Southeast University Journal, 2013, 4:030. 
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Table 2 
Urban Employed Female Classified by Education Level and Industry (%)55 
Education 
level 
Farming, 
Forestry, 
Animal 
Husbandry 
and Fishery 
Mining 
Manufactu
ring 
Production 
and Supply 
of 
Electricity, 
Heat, Gas 
and Water 
Constru
ction 
Whole 
Sale and 
Retail 
Trades 
Elementary  45.6 0.3 16.7 0.1 3.2 14.9 
Junior  19.3 0.4 25.9 0.4 2.5 25.3 
Senior  3.9 1.1 21.5 1.5 1.9 32.1 
Polytechnic 0.9 0.7 15.5 2.2 2.4 18.8 
Undergraduate 0.5 0.5 10.1 1.7 2.1 9.3 
Graduate 0.1 0.4 6.9 0.8 0.7 4.3 
Scientific 
Research and 
Technical 
Service 
Management 
of Water 
Conservancy, 
Environment 
and Public 
Establishment 
Services to 
Households, 
Repair and 
Other 
Services 
Education 
Health and 
Social 
Service 
Culture 
Sports 
and 
Entertai
nment 
Public 
Manageme
nt, Social 
Security 
and Social 
Organizati
on 
0.1 0.7 4.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.6 5.5 1.5 1.0 0.8 1.2 
0.6 0.7 4.7 3.9 3.9 1.2 4.1 
1.4 0.9 2.7 10.7 10.9 2.3 9.4 
2.1 1.1 1.2 21.4 11.2 3.1 13.4 
6.7 0.8 0.5 32.8 12.5 3.7 10.8 
Transport, 
Storage and 
Post 
Hotels and 
Cartering 
Service 
Information 
Transmissio
n, Software 
and 
Information 
Technology 
Finance 
Intermedia
tion 
Real Estate 
Leasing 
and 
Busines
s 
Service
s 
1.1 6.4 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.6 
1.9 8.4 2.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 
3.2 6.3 3.4 2.4 1.7 1.9 
3.5 3.1 4.1 5.1 2.2 3.1 
2.7 1.4 4.6 7.9 1.7 3.9 
1.3 0.4 4.8 8.2 0.8 3.4 
 
  
                                                             
55 2015 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 3-19: Urban Employed Persons by Sex, Education Attainment and Sector 
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In table two, each data represents the proportion of corresponding education level in 
different industry categories, all the data within the same education level adds up to 100%. 
Let’s take the first number 45.6 as an example. It means about 45.6% of the women with 
elementary school degree work in farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery industry. 
Also, I pointed out the top three data in reach column to present the dominant 
education level in each employment category. Unfortunately, the data of specialized 
secondary and technical school degree is not recorded officially.  
As it shows in the graph, the marked data is always adjacent except for the case of 
construction. Since the education degree is listed from the fundamental to the highest, it 
reveals that employers are always hiring people with certain education degree or with other 
similar degree. It is unlikely to happen that the employers are hiring both elementary school 
degree and undergraduate degree at the same time.  
The more important phenomenon is that it shows strongly rank related. It means the 
education levels that belong to the same rank are much more likely to dominate in the 
industry category. There are nine categories are dominated by higher-education rank. There 
are four categories are dominated by both primary-education rank and secondary-education 
rank. There are five categories dominated by both secondary-education and higher-
education ranks.  
If we compare the primary-secondary-education dominant employment and higher-
education dominant employment, we can find that primary-secondary-education dominant 
occupations are more labor-intensive and less technology required, the higher-education 
dominant occupations are more skill-intensive and higher technology required. It is not 
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unusual because these rank-one-dominant occupations require higher skills and knowledge 
which perfectly match the characteristics of polytechnic college and universities students.56  
Since primary-secondary-education dominant occupations require less skills or 
knowledge and the supply of labor in this rank is so huge that 81.3% of female are holding 
primary or secondary education degree57, the employees that belong to primary-secondary-
education dominant industries are more replaceable. In the view of employers, there are 
over four fifth of female population meet the requirements. In the view of employees, it is 
not hard to quit the job and find another one due to the relatively low education background 
requirement. Therefore, the job duration in primary-secondary-education dominant 
industry is relatively short. 58 
If the income discrimination against unmarried women is considered as employers’ 
reaction to the potential loss in the future caused by pregnancy, the employers should 
expect to regain the payoff from employee in the future after pregnancy. That is, the longer 
period an employee spends in this company, the less reduction of salary should there be. 
For the industries with short job duration, the employers worry more about the employees’ 
staying period.  
The income discrimination can be considered as a cost transfer from employers to 
employees. It means the employers are intending to decrease the unmarried women’s 
income on purpose to transfer employer’s expected cost of pregnancy to the employees’ 
                                                             
56 Xuebing Qiao, Wenfan Yao, Dinghai Zhao. Research on the Relationship between Higher Education Structure, 
Graduates' Employment Structure and Industrial Structure [J]. Southeast University Journal, 2013, 4:030. 
 
57 See 2015 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 3-3: Education Attainment of Female Employed Persons by Region 
 
58 Zhilei Shi, Yingmei Xu. Urban Women's Employment Mobility and Its Decision Mechanism [J]. Economics 
Commentary, 2010(4): 56-65 
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themselves.59 If the employees are expected to stay for a short period, the employers are 
likely to reduce the salary of unmarried women more to offset the expected loss due to 
future pregnancy in case there is not enough time to recover the cost. 
 
  
                                                             
59 Jia N, Dong X. Economic transition and the motherhood wage penalty in urban China: investigation using panel data 
[J]. Cambridge Journal of Economics 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Data 
The data used in this study is Chinese Household Income Project, Urban Household 
Survey (CHIP) in the year 2014. This survey includes both urban households and rural 
households. The reason that I ignored the data of rural households is because the 
employment situation in rural area is much more complicated. Part of them are self-
employed, part of them are family business helpers and those who are seeking a job usually 
go out to urban districts. And we can see this situation through the survey questionnaire of 
rural households. Thus, the labor market in rural areas is not typical. 
The data is actually revealing the situation in year 2013 but it is collected and 
organized in year 2014. The following table presents the summary of the key variables. 
Table 3 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
single 4537 0.11 0.310 0 1 
age 4537 39.27 9.248 16 68 
working experience 4537 9.83 9.055 0 45 
employed 4537 0.95 0.224 0 1 
ln(income) 4128 7.74 0.745 1.39 11.92 
Junior high school 4537 0.26 0.439 0 1 
Senior high school 4537 0.18 0.382 0 1 
specialized 4537 0.12 0.327 0 1 
polytechnic college 4537 0.19 0.394 0 1 
undergraduate 4537 0.17 0.377 0 1 
graduate  4537 0.02 0.137 0 1 
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Table 4 
 
Variable Unmarried Married 
Age (mean) 26.22 32.248 
Std.Dev. 3.133 4.035 
Working experience(mean) 4.07 8.27 
Std.Dev. 3.376 5.501 
Employed(mean) 0.90 0.96 
Std.Dev. 0.296 0.204 
Income(mean) 2898.876 3035.7 
Std.Dev. 2296.636 2200.976 
ln(income)(mean) 7.75 7.813 
Std.Dev. 0.737 0.682 
Junior High School(mean) 0.09 0.20 
Std.Dev. 0.292 0.398 
Senior High School(mean) 0.09 0.14 
Std.Dev. 0.282 0.351 
Specialized(mean) 0.12 0.15 
Std.Dev. 0.323 0.354 
Polytechnic College(mean) 0.32 0.23 
Std.Dev. 0.466 0.424 
Undergraduate(mean) 0.31 0.23 
Std.Dev. 0.476 0.420 
Graduate(mean) 0.03 0.04 
Std.Dev. 0.173 0.185 
 
Hypothesis and Goals 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the employment rate gap and income gap 
between unmarried and married women. Furthermore, according to the previous discussion, 
the influence of education level is too important to ignore. There are seven education levels 
in total. The elementary school education level will be omitted in the models to prevent 
perfect collinearity.  
Therefore, there should be two models to be discussed. One is the model used to 
estimate employment rate and the other is used to estimate income. 
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The Logistic Model 
Since employment status is a dummy variable, the model I choose to describe 
employment rate is Logistic Model. Therefore, the dependent variable is employment 
status, it values one if this individual is currently employed, it values zero if the individual 
is currently unemployed. In order to compare the employment rate between unmarried and 
married women, the marital status is the one of the most important independent variable. 
Also, age should be considered as well because age is related to working experience and 
working experience is one important advantage during recruitment. Since different 
education level is tied to some specific industry category and the employment rate in 
different industry category is different, the education level should be included in the model. 
After including age and education level, the martial status should be further discussed by 
using interaction terms. With the interaction terms, we can figure out whether age or 
education level affect differently when the marital status varies.  
One important thing that needs to be clarified is that the all the unmarried women who 
are older than 38 (38 not included) are all employed. This would cause a problem if I 
include the data of women who are older than 38-year. The ability to estimate a marginal 
effect of an additional year of age on employment rate is variation in the status at different 
ages. The fact that all unmarried women over 38 are employed means there is no variation 
there to exploit for estimation. Also, there is no observation of married women under age 
22, therefore, the range of age should be 22 to 38. 
The OLS Model 
The OLS Model is used to estimate the relationship between income and potential 
related variables. The dependent variable is not simply the amount of monthly income, it 
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will be log-linearized. So the dependent variable in the models should be log (income). 
Therefore, the meaning of each regressor’s coefficient is a little bit different. Assume the 
coefficient of a regressor is β, a change in the regressor by one unit is associated with a 
100β% change in monthly income.  
The most important regressors are working experience and marital status. The 
working experience is measured by year and marital status is still a dummy variable. Also, 
the education level will be included to verify the effect of education level.  
Also, there are very few observations of unmarried women who are older than 40. To 
avoid a bias result, the range of age is restricted from 22 to 40.  
In order to choose the proper model, BIC value should be considered. The model with 
lower BIC value should be preferred. If the model with lower BIC value contains more 
variables, a reduction of 10 or more is necessary. 
Results 
Logistic Regression Model 
The results of logistic regression model are shown in Table four. There are four models 
with different variables. The first one is the most basic model that only includes age as the 
independent variable. It shows that age reveals a significant effect.  
The second model is based on the first one and it includes the marital status to verify 
the influence of being single. The marital status shows negative significant effect. 
The third model is based on the second one. In the third model, a new interaction term 
is added: 
single ∗ age 
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This interaction term is used to verify whether age plays a different role between 
unmarried and married women. The coefficient of this interaction term shows significant 
effect and it is positive while the basic age term still does not show any significance. That 
implies the unmarried women can benefit from age increase. In other words, the unmarried 
women can eliminate part of the disadvantage by aging.  
The fourth model includes the education level to see if education level plays an 
important role in the model. However, none of them shows significant effect which means 
education level does not matter in this topic. 
The OLS Model 
The OLS model results are shown in table five. There are four models in total. The 
first model is the basic one. The independent variables are marital status, age and working 
experience. The interaction term of marital status and working experience is also included 
to verify whether unmarried women’s working experience play an different role. The result 
shows that the marital status does not have a significant effect on income, the unmarried 
women’s working experience does not reveal a significant difference. Only the working 
experience shows significant effect.  
The second model is based on the basic one and the only difference is the addition of 
quadratic form of working experience. To verify the effect of being unmarried, the 
following interaction term is also included: 
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒^2 
The result shows that marital status, working experience, quadratic form of working 
experience and the interaction terms have significant effects except that the interaction term 
single ∗ working experience only shows significant effect at 10% level.  
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The third model is based on the first model with the accession of education level and 
interaction terms between marital status and education level: 
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
The result shows that all the new included variables have significant effect except for 
the education level of junior high school. Since the interaction terms show significance, the 
education level affect monthly income differently between married and unmarried women. 
But the interaction term 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝 does not show significance which means 
unmarried women do not receive extra advantage or disadvantage from working experience 
while comparing with married women. 
The fourth model is based on the second model and further includes education level 
and interaction terms. It shows that all the new variables show significance except for the 
education level of junior high school. Also, the quadric form of working experience is 
statistically significant and the interaction term 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝^2 is not significant 
which means the single women do not benefit extra from working experience.  
The last row shows the BIC value of these four models. The third model has the lowest 
BIC value and it is much lesser than that in model one or model two which contain less 
variables. Therefore, it is worth adding these new variables in model. 
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Table 5 
Logistic Regression Results 
Employment Rate 
Variable Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 
age 0.09** 0.08** 0.03 0.03 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) 
single  -0.32** -8.53*** -8.06** 
  (0.265) (2.799) (5.130) 
single*age   0.31** 0.29** 
    (0.109) (0.107) 
junior    -0.86 
     (1.050) 
senior    0.14 
     (1.097) 
specialized    -1.11 
     (1.048) 
polytechnic    -0.25 
     (1.049) 
undergraduate    0.51 
     (1.071) 
graduate    -0.55 
     (1.190) 
constant 0.05 0.70 2.03 2.45* 
  (0.764) (0.945) (1.076) (1.468) 
Pseudo R2 0.0183 0.0202 0.0341 0.0715 
 
*Significant at 10% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6 
OLS Model 
Log Income 
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 
single 0.033 0.179*** -0.364*** -0.313*** 
  (0.046) (0.072) (0.083) (0.105) 
age 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
workexp 0.018*** 0.059*** 0.009*** 0.026*** 
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) 
single*workexp 0.001 -0.045* 0.008 -0.020 
  (0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) 
workexp^2   -0.002***   -0.001** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
single*workexp^2   0.002**   0.001 
    (0.001)   (0.001) 
junior     0.000 0.001 
      (0.081) (0.081) 
senior     0.161* 0.159* 
      (0.082) (0.082) 
specialized     0.169** 0.164** 
      (0.082) (0.082) 
polytechnic     0.342*** 0.335*** 
      (0.080) (0.081) 
undergraduate     0.608*** 0.594*** 
      (0.080) (0.082) 
graduate     0.933*** 0.919*** 
      (0.106) (0.107) 
single*junior     0.230** 0.220** 
      (0.109) (0.109) 
single*senior     0.251** 0.243** 
      (0.119) (0.120) 
single*specialized     0.257** 0.253** 
      (0.101) (0.103) 
single*polytechnic     0.310*** 0.310*** 
      (0.093) (0.095) 
single*undergraduate     0.318*** 0.323*** 
      (0.094) (0.096) 
single*graduate     0.351** 0.361** 
      (0.165) (0.167) 
constant 7.702*** 7.574*** 7.310*** 7.244*** 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.116) (0.119) 
BIC 3418.627 3401.058 3023.755 3032.698 
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Discussion 
Employment Rate Gap 
According to the results in logistic model, the marital status and unmarried women’s 
age show significant effect, married women’s age and education level do not show any 
significance. Let’s take the fourth model to estimates the employment rate gap. Let the 
employment rate gap be the difference between married women’s employment rate and 
unmarried women’s employment rate.  
Married women′s employmnet rate: 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 =
1
1 + 𝑒−2.45
 
Unmarried women′s employment rate: 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 =
1
1 + 𝑒−(−5.61+0.29∗𝑎𝑔𝑒)
 
Employment rate gap: ΔR =
1
1 + 𝑒−2.45
−
1
1 + 𝑒−(−5.61+0.29∗𝑎𝑔𝑒)
 
Figure 17 
 
As shown in figure 6, the employment rate gap is decreasing as age increases. From 
age 22 to age 28, the employment rate gap is a positive decreasing function. It means 
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married women have an advantage of employment rate during this period and this 
advantage is vanishing. At the age 28, the employment rate gap is almost zero which means 
the employment rate of married woman is no longer larger than that of unmarried woman’s. 
After age 28, the employment rate gap is still decreasing but its value becomes negative. I 
believe the fundamental reason is the change of marriage trend through age. Figure 5 has 
shown the proportion of unmarried women by the end of 2015. 
The function of proportion of single women is a decreasing function. Since the 
independent variable is age, the proportion of single women is decreasing along the time. 
After the age 29, the proportion is less than 20%60, after age 35, the proportion is less than 
5% and the function becomes nearly flat.  
Even we are sure about the function being decreasing, we cannot tell how fast it 
decrease from figure 5. If we want to figure out the annual change of the proportion, we 
need focus on figure 6. 
Figure 6 shows how the proportion change vary through time. Each value of a certain 
point represents the difference between the proportion of unmarried women at current age 
and the proportion at previous age. Therefore, the value of -4.4% of the first point means 
the proportion of unmarried women decreases by 4.4% at age 21 comparing with the 
proportion at age 20. With this figure, we can speculate the trend of getting married. From 
the age 21 to age 24, the function is increasing. This means the trend of getting married is 
increasing. At the age 24 to 27, the function remains around -10.5% to -11% level. During 
this period, the trend of getting married is holding still but also remains the highest level 
                                                             
60 To be precise, the proportion at the age 28 is 18.5%. 
48 
among all ages. From age 28, the function decreases significantly which means the trend 
of getting married is decreasing. 
In the view of derivative, the graph in figure 6 can be considered as the derivative of 
the function in figure 5. The derivative function is decreasing from age 21 to age 24, it is 
holding still from age 24 to age 28 and it is increasing from age 28. This means, the second 
derivative is negative from age 21 to age 24, it is zero from age 24 to age 28 and it is 
positive from age 28. Therefore, the original function of female in figure 5 is concave from 
age 21 to age 24 and it is convex from age 28. The concave part of the function in figure 5 
means the population of unmarried women is decreasing faster and faster. The convex part 
of the function in figure 5 means the population of unmarried women is decreasing slower 
and slower. In other words, the unmarried women from 21-year old to 24-year are having 
increasing trend to become married, those who are older than 27-year old are having 
decreasing trend to become married.  
Since the single status is an important factor that employers are focusing on, the 
employers are tending to decrease the discrimination against single women if the women’s 
trend of getting married are expected to decrease. If the unmarried employee is hired at the 
age of 21, the employee is facing an increasing risk of loss due to increasing probability of 
single employee getting married. If the unmarried employee is hired at age of 28, the 
employee is facing a decreasing risk of loss. 
As I discussed before, single women have both advantage and disadvantage 
comparing with married women. The disadvantage is that employers have to bear the risk 
of possible loss due to maternity leave in the future if they hire a single woman which is 
additional cost for employers. The advantage of unmarried women is that they are more 
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flexible with time arrangement or overtime work, so they can concentrate more on working. 
Therefore, when the employer is weighing the advantage and disadvantage of an unmarried 
woman, age is playing an important role here. Let’s assume the unmarried women’s 
advantage is remaining unchanged through age. The risk of loss begin to decrease from age 
28. The possible explanation of the phenomenon that the employment rate gap reaches zero 
at age 28 is because the disadvantage of being unmarried at this age is no longer larger than 
the advantage of being unmarried. In other words, the loss that employers face is indifferent 
from the benefit of hiring an unmarried woman at age 28. Following this idea, we can 
expect that unmarried women are having a higher employment rate after age 28 because 
the loss that employers face is decreasing while the advantage remains still.  
Income Gap 
According to the third model, women with different education degree have different 
functions. For the married women, the estimated functions are shown in the following table 
Table 7                  Estimated Functions for Married Women 
Elementary or Junior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.31 
Senior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.471 
Specialized  ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.479 
Polytechnic ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.652 
Undergraduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.918 
Graduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 8.243 
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For the unmarried women, the estimated functions are shown in the following table: 
Table 8 Estimated Functions for Unmarried Women 
Elementary ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 6.946 
Junior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.176 
Senior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.268 
Specialized ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.372 
Polytechnic ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.598 
Undergraduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.872 
Graduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 8.230 
 
The coefficient of the dummy variable “single” is -0.364. This means the unmarried 
women have a lower income in general. Since the dependent variable is ln(income), this 
means the income will decrease by 36.4% if the dummy variable increases by one unit 
which is switching from married to unmarried.  
The coefficient of working experience is 0.009. This means the working experience 
has a positive effect on income. To be precise, every one additional year of working 
experience leads to 0.9% increase of income.  
The coefficient of the interaction 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝 is not significant. This means 
the unmarried women do not benefit differently from accumulation of working experience 
while comparing with married women.  
The coefficient of each education level is positively significant except for the junior 
school degree and the coefficient is becoming larger if the education level is getting higher. 
This means higher education level can provide a better income. With a senior high school 
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degree, the income will increase by 16.1%. With a specialized secondary and technical 
school degree, the income will increase by 16.9%. With a polytechnic college degree, the 
income will increase by 34.2%. With an undergraduate degree, the income will increase by 
60.8%. With a graduate degree, the income will increase by 93.3%.  
The coefficient of the interaction terms are listed as  
Table 9 Coefficients of Interaction Terms 
single*junior 0.230** 
single*senior 0.251** 
single*specialized 0.257** 
single*polytechnic 0.310*** 
single*undergraduate 0.318*** 
single*graduate 0.351** 
 
This is the one of the most fundamental parts in this model because what I care about 
is whether education level affect single women’s income differently from married women’s. 
According to the data, the single women with a junior high school degree will have 23% 
increase of income. The single women with a senior high school degree will have 25.1% 
increase of income. The single women with a specialized secondary and technical school 
degree will have 25.7% increase of income. The single women with a polytechnic college 
degree will have 31% increase of income. The single women with an undergraduate degree 
will have 31.8% increase of income. The single women with a graduate degree will have 
35.1% increase of income. Comparing with the 39.4% decrease of income of being 
unmarried, this increase can be considered as a compensation effect. The compensation 
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effect that comes with secondary education rank are 23%, 25.1% and 25.7% income 
increase. The compensation effect that comes with higher education rank are 31%, 31.8% 
and 35.1% income increase.  
Since the coefficients of single women with higher education rank are all over 0.3 and 
the difference between these coefficients with the coefficient of being single is not larger 
enough, a hypothesis that 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒∗𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0 should be tested and the results 
are presented in the following table.  
Table 10 
Hypothesis 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒∗𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0 
Education Junior Senior Specialized Polytechnic Undergraduate Graduate  
Prob>F 0.0580 0.0581 0.0583 0.1933 0.2708 0.8346 
     
The results show that the hypothesis of the first three education levels can be rejected 
at 10% and the hypothesis of the rest three education levels cannot be rejected. This means 
among the women with secondary education rank, single women have a significant income 
decrease. However, among the women with higher education rank, there is no significant 
income difference between single and married women.  
It is not a coincidence that the compensation effect is divided into two parts. One 
explanation is the employed category that makes this difference. As I discussed before in 
chapter three, the education rank is highly related to the industry category. The occupations 
that secondary education graduates have are both labor-intensive and high job mobility. 
Women who are employed in these categories are more likely to face discrimination. 
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I believe the discrimination that causes income gap is due to two effects, the basic 
discrimination effect and the compensation effect, the first one is a negative effect and the 
latter one is positive. The discrimination effect is measured by the coefficient of dummy 
variable. The compensation effect is measured by the coefficient of the interaction terms. 
As the result shown, the compensation effect of women with secondary education rank 
degree is less than that of women with higher education rank degree. In other words, 
unmarried women benefit differently from education degree. To be precise, the 
compensation effect of women with secondary education rank degree is not large enough 
to overcome the discrimination effect. But the compensation effect of women with higher 
education rank degree is large enough to overcome the discrimination effect so that income 
difference between unmarried and married is not significant in this case.  
Limitations of the Models 
Since the CHIP data is collected randomly and it is not follow-up data, I cannot use 
the data to estimate a panel data model. The data I use is collected in year 2013 and it is 
cross-sectional, therefore, the previous causal shouldn’t be claimed this easily.  
The newest CHIP data is collected in 2013 and the one-child policy has been replaced 
by two-child policy since 2016. I do not have the employment data after the new policy, so 
I cannot verify how the new policy affects unmarried women, even the women who have 
already had a child.  
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
Due to the high correlation between marriage and child birth, the martial status 
probably reveals the fertility status. Since employers are paying full amount of salary to 
pregnant female, the pregnancy and maternity leave of female employees become extra 
cost to employers. But unmarried women have their own advantages that they have more 
flexible time. The employers tend to weigh the disadvantages and advantage to determine 
whether they should hire unmarried women.  
According to the econometric model, the employment rate gap and income gap are 
estimated. The results show that the employment rate gap exists between unmarried and 
married women, in other words, the same qualified unmarried women are facing a lower 
employment rate when they are younger than 28. When women are older than 28, the 
unmarried women are having an advantage in employment rate because the risk to 
employers are expected to decrease. Also, the education level does not play a role in 
employment rate. It reveals that single women do not benefit or forfeit with the education 
experience. The result also shows the existence of income gap which unmarried women 
are having lower income generally. In the case of unmarried women, there are two effect, 
a positive complementary effect and a negative discrimination effect. The positive effect 
results from education level. The unmarried women with higher education benefit more 
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than those with secondary education on average. The negative discrimination effect is due 
to remaining unmarried. The hypothesis test shows that there is no significant difference 
between the discrimination effect and complementary effect for unmarried women with 
higher education rank degree. For them, being educated is enough to overcome the 
discrimination of being single. But for the women with secondary rank degree, their 
education backgrounds are not sufficient enough to eliminate the discrimination.  
  
56 
Bibliography 
China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2001--2016 
 
Condran J G, Bode J G. Rashomon, working wives, and family division of labor: 
Middletown, 1980[J]. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1982: 421-426. 
 
Anqi Xu, couple’s power and women's family status evaluation index: refection and review 
[J]. Sociological Research, 2005, 4(1) 
 
Fang H, Moro A. Theories of statistical discrimination and affirmative action: A survey[R]. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. 
 
Ying Fu: After two-child policy, female employment discrimination is more prominent  
http://yanglao.china.com.cn/roll/2017/0305/1345.html 
 
Youbao Zhao. Anti-sexism in Job-Hunting: An Economics Analysis [J] Journal of 
Shandong University of Science and Technology: Social Science, 2005, 7(1):70-74 
 
Yanqiong Zhao, Mujun Li, Yue Chen, Pregnancy Anxiety, Depression and Its Influencing 
Factors in Pregnant Women [J]. Journal of Practical Obstetrics and Gynecology, 2006, 
22(10): 608-610. 
 
57 
Kangsi Z. On the Interaction of Gender Discrimination in Employment and Human Capital 
Investment Bias [J]. Journal of Zhejiang University, 2009, 5: 013. 
 
Junfeng Wang, Yan Wang. Research on the Development of Small and Micro Enterprises 
in China [J]. Business Research, 2012 (9):86-93 
 
Becker G S, Becker G S. A Treatise on the Family [M]. Harvard university press, 2009. 
 
Xuebing Qiao, Wenfan Yao, Dinghai Zhao. Research on the Relationship between Higher 
Education Structure, Graduates' Employment Structure and Industrial Structure [J]. 
Southeast University Journal, 2013, 4:030. 
 
Zhilei Shi, Yingmei Xu. Urban Women's Employment Mobility and Its Decision 
Mechanism [J]. Economics Commentary, 2010(4): 56-65 
 
Jia N, Dong X. Economic transition and the motherhood wage penalty in urban China: 
investigation using panel data [J]. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2013, 37: 819-843. 
 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the 
Law of Population and Family Planning, Dec 27th, 2015 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-12/28/content_1957359.htm 
 
58 
2016 Human Resources and Social Security Statistics Express issued by Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security on Feb 15th, 2017. 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/dtyjsu/201702/t20170215_266193.ht
ml 
 
Yongping Jiang. Reform and Perfection of Maternity Insurance System from the 
Perspective of Gender [J] Women's Studies, 2013(1): 47-53 
 
Zijun Yu. A Study on the Legal Problems of Maternity Insurance for Female Workers in 
China [D] University of Anhui, 2015 
 
Speech of director of Institute of International Labor and Social Security, Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security in 2016.  
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2016-07-14/doc-ifxuapvs8416880.shtml 
 
China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2015, 3-17: Urban Employed 
Persons by Age, Sex and Sector 
 
2014 China Women’s Development Program (2011--2020) Implementation Statistics 
Report 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201511/t20151127_1282257.html 
 
 
59 
Implementation Report on the Program for the Development of Chinese Women and 
Children in Shanghai 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw9819/nw9822/u21aw179147.html 
 
The Second Sample Survey of Social Status of Chinese Women 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/200203/t20020331_30606.html 
 
Chinese Household Income Project (2008), Urban Household Survey 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Population and Family Planning, Art.41 
 
Constitution of People’s Republic of China, Art 2.2 
 
Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, Art. 6.2. 
 
Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, Art. 9.2.  
 
Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Women Workers, Art. 7.1. 
 
Report on the development of small micro - enterprises in China, 2013 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-03/31/content_2650031.htm 
 
  
60 
Appendix 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3: 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
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Table 1 
Compulsory Duration Optional Duration 
Pre-maternity leave 1 hour per day for 
2 months 
Optional pre-maternity leave 2 and half 
months 
Breastfeeding time 1 hour per day 
until baby one-
year-old 
Breastfeeding leave 6 and half 
months 
Maternity leave 98 days Protection leave Depends 
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Figure 14 
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Figure 16 
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Table 2 
Urban Employed Female Classified by Education Level and Industry (%) 
Education 
level 
Farming, 
Forestry, 
Animal 
Husbandry 
and Fishery 
Mining 
Manufactu
ring 
Production 
and Supply 
of 
Electricity, 
Heat, Gas 
and Water 
Constru
ction 
Whole 
Sale and 
Retail 
Trades 
Elementary  45.6 0.3 16.7 0.1 3.2 14.9 
Junior  19.3 0.4 25.9 0.4 2.5 25.3 
Senior  3.9 1.1 21.5 1.5 1.9 32.1 
Polytechnic 0.9 0.7 15.5 2.2 2.4 18.8 
Undergraduate 0.5 0.5 10.1 1.7 2.1 9.3 
Graduate 0.1 0.4 6.9 0.8 0.7 4.3 
Scientific 
Research and 
Technical 
Service 
Management 
of Water 
Conservancy, 
Environment 
and Public 
Establishment 
Services to 
Households, 
Repair and 
Other 
Services 
Education 
Health and 
Social 
Service 
Culture 
Sports 
and 
Entertai
nment 
Public 
Manageme
nt, Social 
Security 
and Social 
Organizati
on 
0.1 0.7 4.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.6 5.5 1.5 1.0 0.8 1.2 
0.6 0.7 4.7 3.9 3.9 1.2 4.1 
1.4 0.9 2.7 10.7 10.9 2.3 9.4 
2.1 1.1 1.2 21.4 11.2 3.1 13.4 
6.7 0.8 0.5 32.8 12.5 3.7 10.8 
Transport, 
Storage and 
Post 
Hotels and 
Cartering 
Service 
Information 
Transmissio
n, Software 
and 
Information 
Technology 
Finance 
Intermedia
tion 
Real Estate 
Leasing 
and 
Busines
s 
Service
s 
1.1 6.4 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.6 
1.9 8.4 2.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 
3.2 6.3 3.4 2.4 1.7 1.9 
3.5 3.1 4.1 5.1 2.2 3.1 
2.7 1.4 4.6 7.9 1.7 3.9 
1.3 0.4 4.8 8.2 0.8 3.4 
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Table 3 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
single 4537 0.11 0.310 0 1 
age 4537 39.27 9.248 16 68 
working experience 4537 9.83 9.055 0 45 
employed 4537 0.95 0.224 0 1 
ln(income) 4128 7.74 0.745 1.39 11.92 
Junior high school 4537 0.26 0.439 0 1 
Senior high school 4537 0.18 0.382 0 1 
specialized 4537 0.12 0.327 0 1 
polytechnic college 4537 0.19 0.394 0 1 
undergraduate 4537 0.17 0.377 0 1 
graduate  4537 0.02 0.137 0 1 
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Table 4 
Variable Unmarried Married 
Age (mean) 26.22 32.248 
Std.Dev. 3.133 4.035 
Working experience(mean) 4.07 8.27 
Std.Dev. 3.376 5.501 
Employed(mean) 0.90 0.96 
Std.Dev. 0.296 0.204 
Income(mean) 2898.876 3035.7 
Std.Dev. 2296.636 2200.976 
ln(income)(mean) 7.75 7.813 
Std.Dev. 0.737 0.682 
Junior High School(mean) 0.09 0.20 
Std.Dev. 0.292 0.398 
Senior High School(mean) 0.09 0.14 
Std.Dev. 0.282 0.351 
Specialized(mean) 0.12 0.15 
Std.Dev. 0.323 0.354 
Polytechnic College(mean) 0.32 0.23 
Std.Dev. 0.466 0.424 
Undergraduate(mean) 0.31 0.23 
Std.Dev. 0.476 0.420 
Graduate(mean) 0.03 0.04 
Std.Dev. 0.173 0.185 
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Table 5 
Logistic Regression Results 
Employment Rate 
Variable Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 
age 0.09** 0.08** 0.03 0.03 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) 
single  -0.32** -8.53*** -8.06** 
  (0.265) (2.799) (5.130) 
single*age   0.31** 0.29** 
    (0.109) (0.107) 
junior    -0.86 
     (1.050) 
senior    0.14 
     (1.097) 
specialized    -1.11 
     (1.048) 
polytechnic    -0.25 
     (1.049) 
undergraduate    0.51 
     (1.071) 
graduate    -0.55 
     (1.190) 
constant 0.05 0.70 2.03 2.45* 
  (0.764) (0.945) (1.076) (1.468) 
Pseudo R2 0.0183 0.0202 0.0341 0.0715 
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Table 6 
OLS Model 
Log Income 
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 
single 0.033 0.179*** -0.364*** -0.313*** 
  (0.046) (0.072) (0.083) (0.105) 
age 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
workexp 0.018*** 0.059*** 0.009*** 0.026*** 
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) 
single*workexp 0.001 -0.045* 0.008 -0.020 
  (0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) 
workexp^2   -0.002***   -0.001** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
single*workexp^2   0.002**   0.001 
    (0.001)   (0.001) 
junior     0.000 0.001 
      (0.081) (0.081) 
senior     0.161* 0.159* 
      (0.082) (0.082) 
specialized     0.169** 0.164** 
      (0.082) (0.082) 
polytechnic     0.342*** 0.335*** 
      (0.080) (0.081) 
undergraduate     0.608*** 0.594*** 
      (0.080) (0.082) 
graduate     0.933*** 0.919*** 
      (0.106) (0.107) 
single*junior     0.230** 0.220** 
      (0.109) (0.109) 
single*senior     0.251** 0.243** 
      (0.119) (0.120) 
single*specialized     0.257** 0.253** 
      (0.101) (0.103) 
single*polytechnic     0.310*** 0.310*** 
      (0.093) (0.095) 
single*undergraduate     0.318*** 0.323*** 
      (0.094) (0.096) 
single*graduate     0.351** 0.361** 
      (0.165) (0.167) 
constant 7.702*** 7.574*** 7.310*** 7.244*** 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.116) (0.119) 
BIC 3418.627 3401.058 3023.755 3032.698 
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Figure 17 
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Table 7                  Estimated Functions for Married Women 
Elementary or Junior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.31 
Senior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.471 
Specialized  ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.479 
Polytechnic ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.652 
Undergraduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.918 
Graduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 8.243 
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Table 8 Estimated Functions for Unmarried Women 
Elementary ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 6.946 
Junior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.176 
Senior ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.268 
Specialized ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.372 
Polytechnic ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.598 
Undergraduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 7.872 
Graduate ln(income) = 0.009 ∗ workexp + 8.230 
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Table 9 Coefficients of Interaction Terms 
single*junior 0.230** 
single*senior 0.251** 
single*specialized 0.257** 
single*polytechnic 0.310*** 
single*undergraduate 0.318*** 
single*graduate 0.351** 
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Table 10 
Hypothesis 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒∗𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0 
Education Junior Senior Specialized Polytechnic Undergraduate Graduate  
Prob>F 0.0580 0.0581 0.0583 0.1933 0.2708 0.8346 
 
 
